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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a novel Communication and Obfus-
cation Management Architecture (COMA) to handle the stor-
age of the obfuscation key and to secure the communication
to/from untrusted yet obfuscated circuits. COMA addresses
three challenges related to the obfuscated circuits: First, it
removes the need for the storage of the obfuscation unlock key
at the untrusted chip. Second, it implements a mechanism by
which the key sent for unlocking an obfuscated circuit changes
after each activation (even for the same device), transforming
the key into a dynamically changing license. Third, it pro-
tects the communication to/from the COMA protected device
and additionally introduces two novel mechanisms for the
exchange of data to/from COMA protected architectures: (1)
a highly secure but slow double encryption, which is used for
exchange of key and sensitive data (2) a high-performance
and low-energy yet leaky encryption, secured by means of
frequent key renewal. We demonstrate that compared to state-
of-the-art key management architectures, COMA reduces the
area overhead by 14%, while allowing additional features in-
cluding unique chip authentication, enabling activation as a
service (for IoT devices), reducing the side channel threats on
key management architecture, and providing two new means
of secure communication to/from an untrusted chip.
1 Introduction
The increasing cost of IC manufacturing has pushed several
stages of the semiconductor device’s manufacturing supply
chain to the third-party facilities, which are identified as un-
trusted entities [4]. Fabrication of ICs in an untrusted supply
chain has introduced multiple forms of security threats such
as the possibility of overproduction, Trojan insertion, Reverse
Engineering (RE), Intellectual Property (IP) theft, and counter-
feiting [33, 34]. The stage that poses the utmost vulnerability
is the fabrication stage, in which an untrusted foundry has
the ultimate knowledge about a to-be-fabricated IC, and with
minimal effort could reverse engineer the GDSII to its gate-
level netlist, analyze, copy, and/or alter the design, creating
trust and security challenges for the original design house.
Considering that a foundry has the ultimate knowledge
about the design, passive protection techniques such as wa-
termarking, IC metering, or camouflaging [1, 28, 43, 52] are
not well suited to protect against attacks initiated at this stage
of supply chain, although they can be used to either iden-
tify counterfeits, or prevent reverse engineering of the man-
ufactured ICs post fabrication. To protect the IP from being
reverse engineered, overproduced, or stolen in the manufac-
turing supply chain, researchers have studied various means
of hardware obfuscation [17, 18, 20, 21, 28, 35–37, 47, 53],
which is the process of hiding the true functionality of an
IC when no key, or an incorrect key, is present. Only once
the correct key is provided, the IC behaves correctly. The
requirement for obfuscated solutions is to resist various forms
of attacks against such circuits including brute force, sensiti-
zation, Boolean satisfiability (SAT) or satisfiability modulo
theories (SMT), removal, approximate-based, signal probabil-
ity skew, functional analysis, etc. [11,26,29,30,38,40,41,46].
To remain hidden, in addition to resisting the attacks against
its obfuscated circuit(s), the IC should also resist passive, ac-
tive, or destructive attacks that could be deployed to read
the key values. Hence, neither the activation of such devices
nor the storage of key values in them should expose or leak
the key information. Activation of an obfuscated IC requires
storing the activation key in a secure and tamper-proof mem-
ory. [25, 42]. However, there exist a group of applications
that could use an alternative key storage. This alternative
solution is to store the key outside the IC, where the IC is ac-
tivated every time it is needed. This option requires constant
connectivity to the key management source and a secure com-
munication for key exchange to prevent any leakage of the key.
This solution allows an IC designer to store the chip unlock
key outside of an untrusted chip. So, no secure and tamper-
proof memory is needed. Since the key is stored outside the
untrusted chip, a constant connectivity to an obfuscation key-
management solution is an indispensable requirement for this
category of devices. This requirement could be easily met for
two prevalent groups of architectures: (1) 2.5D package-stack
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devices where a single trusted chip is used for key manage-
ment and activation of multiple obfuscated ICs manufactured
in untrusted foundries, and (2) IoT devices with constant con-
nectivity to the cloud/internet.
In 2.5D package-integrated ICs, similar to DARPA SPADE
architecture [10], a chip which is fabricated in a trusted
foundry, but in a larger technology node, is packaged with an
untrusted chip fabricated in an untrusted foundry in a smaller
technology node. The resulting solution benefits from the best
features of both technologies: The untrusted chip may be used
as an accelerator, providing the resulting hybrid solution with
the much-needed scalability (higher speed and lower power),
while the trusted chip provides the means of trust and security.
The untrusted chip is isolated from the outside world and
any exchange of information to/from untrusted chip passes
through the trusted chip.
The second group of devices in this category are IoT de-
vices, where constant connectivity is their characterizing fea-
tures. In these solutions the obfuscation key could be stored
in the cloud, and activation of an IoT device could be done
remotely. This model allows custom, monitored, and service
oriented activation (Activation As A Service). An additional
advantage is removing the possibility of extracting an unlock
key from a non-volatile memory that otherwise would have
to be used for storing the obfuscation unlock key. Examples
of which are IoT devices used for providing various services,
military drones activated for a specific mission, video decryp-
tion services for paid pay-per-view transactions, etc., where a
device has to operate in an unsafe environment and is at risk
of capture and reverse engineering. In these applications, the
IC fabricated in an untrusted foundry is activated either every
time it is powered up, or for certain time intervals. The key
vanishes after the service is performed, or when the device is
powered down. The activation of such devices is performed
using a remote key management service (in the cloud or at
a trusted base-station), and the key exchange to/from these
devices should be secured.
In both 2.5D system solutions and IoT devices, the need
for implementation of a tamper-proof memory, for storage of
IC activation key, in an untrusted process is removed. Some
reasons why implementing a secure memory in an untrusted
foundry may be undesired, or practically unfeasible include:
Availability: The targeted foundry may not offer the re-
quired process for implementing a secure memory with the
desired features. An example could be the requirement for
storing sensitive information in magnetic tunnel junction
(MTJ) memories to prevent probing and attacks that could
be deployed against flash-based NVMs. Fabricating such ICs
requires a hybrid process that supports both CMOS and MTJ
devices, which may be unsupported by the targeted foundry.
Verified Security: The secure memory may be available
in the targeted technology, however not be fully tested and
verified in terms of its resistance against different attacks.
Cost: Implementing secure memory requires additional
fabrication layers and processing steps, increasing the cost
of manufacturing. Increasing the silicon area is a far cheaper
solution than increasing the number of fabrication layers.
Reusability: In 2.5D system solutions, a trusted chip could
be shared by multiple untrusted chips, manufactured in dif-
ferent foundries. Moving the secure memory to the trusted
chip removes the need for implementing the secure memory
in all utilized processes. The trusted chip could be designed
once with utmost security for protection and integrity of data.
This also reduce the cost of manufacturing untrusted chips by
removing the need for additional processing steps for imple-
menting secure memory.
Ease of Design: Implementing secure memory requires
pushing the design through non-standard physical design flow
to implement the tamper-proof layers in silicon and package.
In addition, the non-volatile nature of tamper-proof memory
requires read and write at elevated voltages, increasing the bur-
den on the power-delivery network design. Reuse of a trusted
chip with a tamper proof memory that could manage activa-
tion of other obfuscated ICs, relaxes the design requirement
of ICs to standard physical design and fabrication process.
In this paper, we propose the COMA key-management and
communication architecture for secure activation of obfus-
cated circuits that are manufactured in untrusted foundries
and meet the constant connectivity requirement, namely ICs
that belong to a) 2.5 package-integrated and b) IoT solutions.
We describe two variants of our proposed solutions: The first
variant of COMA is used for secure activation of IPs within
2.5D package-integrated devices (similar to DARPA SPADE).
The second variant of COMA is used for secure activation of
connected IoT devices. The proposed COMA allows us to (1)
push the obfuscation key and obfuscation unlock mechanism
off of an untrusted chip, (2) make the key a moving target by
changing it for each unlock attempt, (3) uniquely identify each
IC, (4) remove the need to implementing a secure memory in
an untrusted foundry, and (5) utilize two novel mechanisms
for ultra-secure or ultra-fast encrypted communication.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the background and related work to secure key-
exchange and obfuscation schemes. Section 3 demonstrates
how the proposed method has significant advantages in terms
of security and performance. Both variants of the proposed
architecture are evaluated in this Section. The security of
the proposed architecture against various attacks is discussed
in Section 4. The experimental results, as well as compari-
son with prior-art methods, is presented in Sections 5 and 6.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Background
Active metering, Secure Split-Test, logic obfuscation, and
solutions such as Ending Piracy of Integrated Circuits (EPIC)
have been proposed to protect ICs from supply chain-related
security threats by initializing the HW control to a locked state
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at power-up and hiding the design intent [2,15,16,23,27,28,44,
52]. Some of these techniques support single activation, while
others support active metering mechanisms. Active metering
techniques [15, 27, 44, 52] provide a mechanism for the IP
owner to lock or unlock the IC remotely. In these solutions,
the locking mechanism is a function of a unique ID generated
for each IC, possibly and preferably by a Physical Unclonable
Function (PUF) [42]. Only the IP owner knows the transition
table and can unlock the IC. Active metering, combined with
a PUF, makes the key a moving target from chip to chip.
However, there exist a few issues with previous metering
techniques: first, the key(s) to unlock each IC remains static.
Second, these techniques unlock the chips before they are
tested by the foundry. Hence, the IP owner can control how
many ICs enter the supply chain, but not how many properly
tested ICs exit the supply chain. Finally, these techniques do
not respond well to the threat of the foundry requesting more
IDs by falsifying the yield to be lower during the test process.
Such shortcomings can potentially allow the foundry to ship
more out-of-spec or defective ICs to the supply chain.
Many of these shortcoming were addressed in FORTIS
[49] shown in Fig. 1. In FORTIS the registers that hold the
obfuscation key are made a part of the scan chain, allowing
the foundry to carry structural test by assigning test values to
these registers prior to the activation of the IC. Authors of [49]
argue that placing a DFT compression logic, not only reduces
the test size, but also prevents the readout of the individual
register values. After testing the IC, the obfuscation key is
transferred and applied to unlock the circuit using two types
of cryptographic modules: a public-key crypto engine, and a
One Time Pad (OTP) crypto engine.
In FORTIS, the public and private keys are hardwired in
the design. A TRNG is used to generate a random number
(m) that is treated as a message. This message is encrypted
using the private key of the chip to generate a signature sig(m).
The actual message and its signature are concatenated and
later used as a mean for the authentication of the chip. At
the same time, the TRNG generates another random number
KS. This random number is used as the key for OTP, and
at the same time is encrypted using the public key of the
designer to generate KDpub(KS). OTP uses KS for encrypting
the (m,sig(m)), and the output of OTP is concatenated with
the KDpub(KS). The resulting string of bits is transmitted to
the SoC designer. The SoC designer uses a OTP to obtain m
and sig(m) for the purpose of authentication. She then uses
the private key of the designer to recover KS. Finally, KS is
used by OTP to encrypt the chip unlock key (CUK). The
encrypted CUK is transmitted to the chip, decrypted using
OTP, and applied to the obfuscation unlock key registers to
unlock the circuit.
FORTIS, however, suffers from several security issues in-
cluding 1) using identical public and private keys in all manu-
factured chips, and thus its inability for unique device authen-
tication, 2) being vulnerable to modeling attack in which the
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Figure 1: FORTIS: Overall Architecture.
FORTIS structure is modeled in software for requesting the
CUK from SoC designer 3) being vulnerable to side channel
attacks on public-key encryption engine aimed at recover-
ing the private key of the chip, 4) being vulnerable to fault
attacks in which the value of KS is fixated, 5) requiring a
secure memory for storage of the obfuscation unlock key,
and 6) not addressing the mechanism for generating a unique
and truly random seed to initialize PRNG. After describing
our proposed solution, in section 6, we explain how these
vulnerabilities are addressed in our proposed solution.
Our proposed solution fits the category of active metering
techniques. The key is neither static nor stored in the untrusted
chip. A key that is used to activate the IC at the test time
cannot be reused to activate the same or a different IC in
the future. Hence, the test facility is able to accomplish the
test process using ATPG tools with a key which is valid for
structural/functional test and it is not valid for any subsequent
activation. Additionally, the communication to/from IC is
secured using a side-channel protected cryptographic engine,
combined with a dynamic switching and inversion structure
that enhances the security of the chip against invasive and side-
channel attacks. We demonstrate that COMA provides two
useful means of secure communication to/from the untrusted
chip, one for added security, and one for supporting a higher
throughput. The proposed architecture is a comprehensive
solution for the key management of the obfuscated IPs, where
the challenges related to the activation of the IC and secure
communication to/from the IC are addressed at the same time.
However, as discussed earlier, it is not a universal solution and
would fit within the context of IoT-based solutions or within
2.5D package-integrated solutions, as this solution requires
constant connectivity.
3 Proposed COMA Architecture
The primary goal of the COMA is to remove the need for
storing the obfuscation key (OK) on an untrusted chip while
securing the communication flow used for activation of the
obfuscated circuit in the untrusted chip. The additional ben-
efits of the proposed architecture are the implementation of
two new modes of 1) highly secure and 2) very high-speed
encrypted communication. We propose two variants of the
COMA architecture: The first variant is designed for secur-
ing the activation of the obfuscated IP and communication
to/from an untrusted IC in 2.5D package-integrated architec-
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Figure 2: Proposed COMAs for (left) 2.5D and (right) IoT-
based/remote devices.
tures similar to the DARPA SPADE architecture [10] (denoted
by 2.5D-COMA). The second proposed architecture is de-
signed for protecting IoT-based or remotely activated/metered
devices (denoted by R-COMA). Fig. 2 captures the overall
architecture of two variants of the proposed COMAs.
3.1 2.5D-COMA: Protecting 2.5D package in-
tegrated system solutions
The DARPA SPADE project [10] explores solutions in which
an overall system is split-manufactured between two differ-
ent technologies, In this solution, a trusted IC which is con-
structed in an older yet secure technology is packaged with
an IC fabricated in an untrusted foundry in an advanced ge-
ometry. The purpose of this solution is to provide the best of
two worlds: the security of older yet trusted technology and
the scalability, power, and speed of the newer yet untrusted
technology. The 2.5D-COMA is designed to work with an
architecture similar to the DARPA SPADE architecture. The
proposed solution allows an entire or partial IP in an untrusted
chip to be obfuscated, while pushing the mechanism for un-
locking and secure activation of the untrusted chip out to a
trusted chip. In this solution, the trusted chip encapsulates the
sensitive information, verifies the integrity of the untrusted
chip, performs sensitive logic monitoring, and controls the
activation of the untrusted chip. Also, the key to unlock the
obfuscated circuit changes per activation, details of which
will be explained shortly.
As shown in Fig. 2, the two variants of COMA contain
two main parts, the trusted side (green) and the untrusted side
(red). In both variants, the architectures of untrusted chips
are identical, and only the architectures of trusted sides are
different. In 2.5D-COMA, only the trusted chip is equipped
with a secure memory. The secure memory stores the Obfus-
cation Key (OK) and the Secret Key (SK) used for encrypted
communication between the trusted and untrusted chips. The
SK is generated using a PUF in the untrusted chip, thus it is
unique for each untrusted chip, and the untrusted chip does
not need a secure memory to store the SK. The Configurable
Switching Network (CSN) and Reverse CSN (RCSN) are log-
arithmic routing and switching networks. They are capable of
permuting the order and possibly inverting the logic levels of
their primary inputs while these signals are being routed to dif-
ferent primary outputs. The RCSN is the exact inverse of the
CSN. Hence, passing a signal through CSN-RCSN (or RCSN-
CSN) will recover the original input. The switching and in-
version behavior of CSN-RCSN is configured using a True
Random Number (TRN). This TRN is generated in the trusted
chip to avoid any potential weakening/manipulating of the
TRNG. In addition, since the TRNG in COMA is equipped
with standard-statistical-tests applied post-fabrication, such
as Repetition-Count test and the Adaptive-Proportion test, as
described in NIST SP 800-90B [12], any attempt at weaken-
ingthe TRNG during regular operation (i.e. fault attack) can
be detected by continuously checking the output of a source
of entropy for any signs of a significant decrease in entropy,
noise source failure, and hardware failure. By using TRN for
the CSN-RCSN configuration, any signal passing through the
CSN is randomized, and then by passing through the RCSN
is recovered. Additional details are provided in section 3.3.1.
The untrusted chip unlock process in COMA is as follows:
Prior to each activation, the CSN and RCSN are configured
with the same TRN. Since the SK is a PUF-based key gen-
erated at the untrusted side, first the SK must be securely
readout from untrusted chip. This is done by deploying public
key cryptography, the details of which are described in section
3.3.4. Then, the trusted chip encrypts the TRN using the SK
and sends it to the untrusted chip. To perform an activation,
as shown in Fig. 2, the OK is read in segments, denoted as
Partial Obfuscation Key (POK), and is passed through the
CSN and encryption on the trusted side and the decryption
and RCSN on the untrusted side. This process is repeated
every time the obfuscated circuit in the untrusted chip is to be
activated, each time using a different TRN for configuring the
CSN-RCSN. Usage of a different TRN as the configuration
input for the CSN-RCSN for each activation randomizes the
input data to Secret key crypto engine. Hence, by using a
different TRN for each activation, the obfuscation key (after
passing through CSN) is transformed into a one-time license,
denoted as Dynamic Activation License (DAL). Since the OK
is read and sent in segments (from trusted chip), the DAL
will be received (at untrusted chip) in segments, denoted as
Dynamic Partial Obfuscation Key (DPOK), shown in Fig. 2,
and is used as an input to RCSN. Passing DPOKs through
RCSN recovers the POKs, and concatenating the POKs will
generate the OK. Note that the DAL is only valid until the
TRN is changed. So, the DAL cannot be used to activate other
chips or the same chip at a later time.
In 2.5D-COMA, the untrusted chip(s) is used as an accel-
erator, and for safety reasons should not be able to directly
communicate to the outside world. Hence, all communica-
tion to/from the untrusted chip must go through the trusted
chip. In addition, it is possible that the computation, depend-
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Figure 3: Modes of Encrypted Communication in COMA
ing on the sensitivity of processed data, is divided between
the trusted and untrusted chips. Hence, there is a need for
constant communication between the trusted and untrusted
chips. The communication needed is sometimes for limited
but highly sensitive data, and sometimes for vast amounts of
less sensitive data. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the proposed archi-
tecture is designed to provide two hybrid means of encrypted
communication : (1) Double-Cipher Communication (DCC)
as ultra-secure communication, and (2) Leaky-Cipher Com-
munication (LCC) as ultra-fast communication mechanism.
3.1.1 Double-Cipher Communication (DCC)
As shown in Fig. 3(a), DCC is implemented by passing each
message through both CSN-RCSN and the secret key cryptog-
raphy engine, where the TRN used in CSN-RCSN is renewed
every U cycles. DCC provides the ultimate protection against
side-channel attacks. In DCC mode, two necessary require-
ments for mounting a side channel attack are eliminated. The
side channel attack aims to break the cryptography system by
analyzing the leaked side channel information for different
input patterns. Hence, (1) the degree of correlation between
the input and the leaked side-channel information, and (2) the
intensity of side-channel variation, are important. In COMA,
the attacker cannot control the input to the secret-key cryp-
tography. In addition, the input to the CSN is randomized
using a TRN and then passed to the secret-key cryptography,
removing the correlation between leaked side channel info
(from secret-key cryptography) and the original input to the
CSN. Additionally, the secret-key cryptography engine is side-
channel protected to pass a t-test [6]. So, the intensity and
variation in side-channel information is significantly reduced,
making the DCC an extremely difficult attack target.
3.1.2 Leaky-Cipher Communication (LCC)
LCC is a fast and energy efficient mode of communication
between the trusted (or remote device) and the untrusted chip.
As illustrated in Fig. 3(b), in this protocol, the CSN-RCSN
pair is used for exchanging data. The secret key cryptogra-
phy engine is used to transmit a TRN from one chip to the
other. Since the throughput of TRNG is the bottleneck point
compared to the performance of CSN-RCSN, the TRNG is
used as a seed generator to the PRNG (which offers higher
performance) on both sides, Hence, in LCC mode, PRNG is
used to configure the CSN-RCSN to avoid any performance
degradation on transmitting data. For U consecutive cycles,
the PRNG is kept idle allowing the CSN to use the same
PRNG output for U cycles. It not only reduces the power
consumption of PRNG and TRNG, it also provides faster
communication in LCC mode. However, using this model
of communication is prone to algebraic and SAT attacks as
each communicated message leaks some information about
the TRN used to configure the CSN-RCSN pair. If an attacker
can control the message and observe the output of the CSN,
each communicated message leaks some information about
the key, reducing its security. Extracting the key from such
observations is possible by various attack models, including
Satisfiability attacks. Hence, an attacker with enough time
and enough traces could extract the TRN and retrieve the
communicated messages. Preventing such attacks poses a
minimum limit to U (the update frequency of the PRNG). U
should be small to prevent SAT and other trace-based learning
or analysis attacks, but large enough to be energy efficient.
In Section 5, we deploy a SAT attack against LCC and will
further elaborate on the required TRN update frequency.
3.2 R-COMA: for Protecting IoT devices
The R-COMA architecture in the untrusted chip is identi-
cal to that of 2.5D-COMA. However, the trusted chip is re-
placed with a remote key management service. The R-COMA
provides a mechanism for an IP owner to remotely activate
parts or entire functionality of the hardware. Similar to 2.5D-
COMA, the DAL is different from chip to chip and from
activation to activation. In R-COMA, the obfuscation unlock
key is stored in a central database, while the CSN, the TRNG
for configuring CSN-RCSN, and the secret key cryptography
engine are implemented in software.
In R-COMA, an authentication server (AS) first securely
receives the PUF-based SK from the untrusted chip. Then, it
generates a TRN and sends it to the untrusted chip for RCSN
configuration. Then, the AS starts sending the obfuscation
key (OK). For the activation phase, the communication is dou-
ble encrypted and authenticated using the CSN-RCSN and
side-channel protected cryptography engine. Each COMA-
protected device needs to be registered with the AS to receive
the obfuscation key. The registration is done using the PUF-
ID of the untrusted chip. Hence, the PUF is used for both
authentication and generation of the secret key for communi-
cation. In R-COMA, the generation of DAL is granted after
PUF authentication, and is based on the generated TRN, and
the stored OK, which is generated at design time. The genera-
tion of DAL is algorithmic and takes linear time.
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Figure 5: Logarithmic Network (a) Omega-based Blocking,
(b) LOG8,1,1 near Non-blocking.
3.3 Implementation Detail of COMA
Fig. 4 captures the overall architecture of COMA and relation
and connectivity of its macros. As discussed, COMA sup-
ports both key-management and secure data communication.
Based on the selected mode of communication (LCC/DCC),
the message passes through {CSN → RCSN} or {CSN →
encryption → decryption → RCSN}. RNG, which contains
both TRNG and PRNG, is used in both sides. In the trusted
chip, RNG is used for implementing side-channel protected
cryptography engine, as well as generating the configuration
of the CSN-RCSN (TRN). In the untrusted side, it is used
only for implementing the side-channel protected cryptogra-
phy engine. Finally, PUF is engaged in the untrusted chip for
both unique IC authentication and for generation of the secret
key for encryption. As shown in Fig. 4, all modules employ
an AXI-stream interface to maximize the simplicity of the
overall design, and minimize the overhead incurred by the
controller of the top module in each side. The description of
the behavior of each macro in COMA is provided next:
3.3.1 Configurable Switching Network (CSN)
The CSN is a logarithmic routing network that could route
the signals at its input pins to its output pins while permuting
their order and possibly inverting their logic levels based on
its configuration. Fig. 5(a) captures a simple implementation
of an 8-by-8 CSN using OMEGA [19] network. The network
is constructed using routing elements, denoted as Re-Routing
Blocks (RRB). Each RRB is able to possibly invert and route
each of the input signals to each of its outputs. The number of
RRBs needed to implement this simple CSN for N inputs (N
is a power of 2) is simply N/2∗ logN. Each CSN should be
paired with an RCSN. The RCSN, is simply constructed by
flipping the input/output pins of RRB, and treating the CSN
input pins as its output pins and vice versa.
The OMEGA network along with many other networks
of such nature (Butterfly, etc.) are blocking networks [19],
in which we cannot produce all permutations of input at the
network’s output pins. This limitation significantly reduces
the ability of a CSN to randomize its input. Also, we will
show that a blocking CSN can be easily broken by a SAT
attack within few iterations.
Being a blocking or a non-blocking CSN depends on the
number of stages in CSN. Since no two paths in an RRB
are allowed to use the same link to form a connection, for
a specific number of RRB columns, only a limited number
of permutations is feasible. However, adding extra stages
could transform a blocking CSN into a strictly non-blocking
CSN. Using a strictly non-blocking CSN not only improves
the randomization of propagated messages through the CSN,
but also improves the resiliency of these networks against
possible SAT attacks for extraction of a TRN used as the
key for a CSN-RCSN cipher. A non-blocking logarithmic
network could be represented using LOGn,m,p, where n is the
number of inlets/outlets, m is the number of extra stages, and
p indicates the number of copies vertically cascaded [9].
According to [9], to have a strictly non-blocking CSN for
an arbitrary n, the smallest feasible values of p and m impose
very large area/power overhead. For instance, for n = 64, the
smallest feasible values, which make it strictly non-blocking,
are m = 3 and p = 6, which means there exists more than
5× as much overhead compared to a blocking CSN with the
same n, resulting in a significant increase in the area and
delay overhead. To avoid such large overhead, we employ a
close to non-blocking CSN described in [9] to implement the
CSN-RCSN pair. This network is able to generate not all, but
almost all permutations, while it could be implemented using
a LOGn,log2(n)−2,1 configuration, meaning it needs log2(n)−2
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extra stages and no additional copy. Fig. 5(b), demonstrates an
example of such a close-to-non-blocking CSN with n = 8. In
the results section, we demonstrate that using these close-to-
non-blocking CSNs enhances the resiliency of a CSN against
SAT attack, even in small sizes of CSNs with significantly
lower power, performance and area (PPA) overhead.
3.3.2 Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
The Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
is used in the DCC mode for communicating messages, and in
the LCC mode for the initial transmission of the CSN-RCSN
key (TRN). Authenticated ciphers incorporate the functional-
ity of confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. The input
of an authenticated cipher includes Message, Associated Data
(AD), Public Message Number (NPUB), and a secret key.
The ciphertext is generated as a function of these inputs. A
Tag, which depends on all inputs, is generated after message
encryption to assure the integrity and authenticity of the trans-
action. This tag is then verified after the decryption process.
The choice of AEAD could significantly affect the area over-
head of the solution, the speed of encrypted communication,
and the extra power consumption. To show the performance,
power, and area trade-offs, we employ two AEAD solutions:
a NIST compliant solution (AES-GCM), and a promising
lightweight solution (ACORN).
AES-GCM is the current National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) standard for authenticated encryp-
tion and decryption as defined in [32]. ACORN is one of
two finalists of the Competition for Authenticated Encryption:
Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR), in the cat-
egory of lightweight authenticated ciphers, as defined in [22].
An 8-bit side-channel protected version of AES-GCM and
a 1-bit side-channel protected version of ACORN are imple-
mented as described in [51]. Both implementations comply
with lightweight version of the CAESAR HW API [13].
Our methodology for side channel resistant is threshold
implementation (TI), which has wide acceptance as a prov-
ably secure Differential Power Analysis (DPA) countermea-
sure [45]. In TI, sensitive data is separated into shares and the
computations are performed on these shares independently.
TI must satisfy three properties: 1) Non-completeness: Each
share must lack at least one piece of sensitive data, 2) Correct-
ness: The final recombination of the result must be correct,
and 3) Uniformity: An output distribution should match the
input distribution. To ensure uniformity, we refresh TI shares
after non-linear transformations using randomness. We use a
hybrid 2-share/3-share approach, where all linear transforma-
tions in each cipher are protected using two shares, which are
expanded to three shares only for non-linear transformations.
To verify the resistance against DPA, we employ the Test
Vector Leakage Assessment methodology in [6]. We lever-
age a "fixed versus random" non-specific t-test, in which we
randomly interleave first fixed test vectors and then randomly-
generated test vectors, leading to two sequences with the
same length but different values. Using means and variances
of power consumption for our fixed and random sequences,
we compute a figure of merit t. If |t| > 4.5, we reason that
we can distinguish between the two populations and that our
design is leaking information. The protected AES-GCM de-
sign has a 5-stage pipeline and encrypts one 128-bit input
block in 205 cycles. This requires 40 bits of randomness per
cycle. In ACORN-1, there are ten 1-bit TI-protected AND-
gate modules, which consume a total of 20 random reshare,
and 10 random refresh bits per state update. In a two-cycle
architecture, 15 random bits are required per clock cycle.
3.3.3 Random Number Generator (RNG)
An RNG unit is required on both sides to generate random bits
for side channel protection of AEAD units, a random public
message number (NPUB) for AEAD, and TRNs for CSN-
RCSN. We adopted the ERO TRNG core described in [39],
which is capable of generating only 1-bit of random data per
over 20,000 clock cycles. In our TI implementations, AES-
GCM needs 40 and ACORN 15 bits of random data per cycle.
So, we employed a hybrid RNG unit combining the ERO
TRNG with a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG).
TRNG output is used as a 128-bit seed to PRNG. The PRNG
generates random numbers needed by other components. The
reseeding is performed only once per activation.
The choice of PRNG depends on the expected performance
and overhead. To support COMA, we adopted two different
implementations of PRNG: (1) AES-CTR PRNG, which is
based on AES, is compliant with the NIST standard SP 800-
90A, and generates 12.8 bits per cycle. (2) Trivium based
PRNG, which is based on the Trivium stream cipher described
in [7]. The Trivium-based PRNG is significantly smaller in
terms of area and much faster than AES-CTR PRNG. It can
generate 64 bits of random data per cycle, however, it is not
compliant with the NIST standard.
3.3.4 PUF and Secure PUF Readout
The response of the PUF to a challenge selected randomly by
Enrollment Authority (SoC designer) is used as the secret key
in AEAD. Hence, the readout of the PUF-response should
be protected. The simplest solution for the safe readout of
a PUF-generated key is to enable the readout by burning
one set of fuses, and disabling it by burning a second set
of fuses. However, this solution, especially when combined
with a weak PUF, is not likely to be resistant against the
untrusted foundry, which may possibly burn the first set of
fuses, read out PUF key, and then repair fuses before releasing
the chip. To avoid this problem, we implement a lightweight
one-sided public key cryptography (encryption only) based
on Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC). Considering the PUF
readout is a one-time event, the performance of the public-key
cryptography engine is not critical.
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In order to prevent any attempts at fully characterizing
a PUF in the untrusted foundry, only strong PUFs, e.g. an
arbiter PUF, are considered. The secure readout of the PUF
key is allowed only at the device enrollment time, in the
secure facility. During the secure readout, the strong PUF
is fed with multiple challenges selected by the Enrollment
Authority. The corresponding PUF responses are encrypted
by the untrusted chip using the public key of the Enrollment
Authority, that is embedded in the chip layout or stored in
the one-time programmable memory. Only the Enrollment
Authority has access to the decrypted responses. Afterwords,
one of the previously applied challenges is randomly selected
and used for the generation of the secret key. This challenge
is then hardwired on the untrusted chip, and the PUF response
to that challenge is recorded by the Enrollment Authority.
This PUF response is then stored in the secure memory of the
trusted chip in 2.5D-COMA, or in the secure cloud directory
in R-COMA. This process makes each PUF key unique to a
given device, and resistant against any unauthorized readout
by the untrusted foundry.
Still, additional precautions must be taken to protect this
scheme against an attack aimed at replacing a real PUF by
a pseudo-PUF, generating randomly looking responses that
can be easily calculated by an attacker. An example of such
a pseudo-PUF may be a lightweight symmetric-key cipher,
with a fixed key known to the untrusted party, encrypting each
challenge and outputing a ciphertext as the PUF response.
Such pseudo-PUF should be treated as a Trojan and de-
tected by Enrollment Authority using the best known anti-
Trojan techniques, e.g., those based on the measurement and
analysis of the power consumption during the operation of the
device [8]. Additional methods may be used to differentiate
the outputs of a strong PUF from encrypted data, e.g., using
known correlations between the PUF responses correspond-
ing to closely-related challenges, such as challenges differing
on only one bit position, or being mutual complements of each
other [24]. These kinds of PUF-health tests may be specific
to a particular strong PUF type, e.g., to an arbiter PUF, and
will be the subject of our future work.
4 COMA Resistance against various Attacks
4.1 Assumed Attacker Capabilities
Different sources of vulnerability are considered in this sec-
tion to demonstrate the COMA security. The attacker can
be an adversary in the manufacturing supply chain, and
has access to either the reverse engineered or design house-
generated netlist of the COMA-protected untrusted chip. The
attacker can purchase an activated COMA-protected IC from
the market. The attacker can monitor the side channel infor-
mation of chips at or post activation. The attacker can observe
the communication between untrusted and trusted (or remote
manager) chips and could also alter the communicated data.
An Attack objective may be (1) extracting the obfuscation
key (OK), (2) illegal activation of the obfuscated circuit with-
out extracting the key, (3) extracting the long-term secret key
(SK), (4) extracting short-term CSN keys (TRNs), (5) eaves-
dropping on messages exchanged between the untrusted chip
and the external sources, (6) removing the COMA protection,
or (7) COMA-protected IC overproduction.
4.2 Side Channel Attack (SCA)
The objective of SCA on COMA is to extract either the secret
key (SK) used by AEAD or the TRN used by CSN. Extracting
a SK is sufficient to break the obfuscation; extracting a TRN
reveals only messages sent in the LCC mode.
DCC significantly increases the SCA difficulty, since
(1) the AEAD is side-channel protected, and (2) the attacker
loses access to the input of AEAD. Fig. 6 captures our as-
sessment of side channel resistance of AEAD using a t-test
for unprotected and protected implementations of AES-GCM
and ACORN [50]. As illustrated, both implementations pass
the t-test, indicating increased resistance against SCA. On
the other hand, the inability to control the input to AEAD
comes from the COMA requirement of encryption in the DCC
mode where a message first passes through the CSN. Hence,
there exists no relation between the power consumption of the
AEAD and the original input due to CSN randomization. CSN
power consumption is also randomized as it is a function of n
inputs (possibly known to the attacker) and 3n× (log2n−1)
TRN inputs unknown to the attacker, while the TRN is repeat-
edly updated based on the value of U . Note that during the
physical design of COMA, the side channel information on
power and voltage noise (IR drop) could be further mitigated
using timing aware IR analysis [3], and voltage noise aware
clock distribution techniques [5, 31].
The LCC mode is prone to side-channel, algebraic, and
SAT attacks aimed at extracting the TRN. However, the attack
must be carried out in a limited time while the TRN of the
CSN/RCSN is unchanged. As soon as the TRN is renewed,
the previous side-channel traces or SAT iterations are useless.
The period of TRN updates (U) introduces a trade-off between
energy and security and can be pushed to maximum security
by changing the TRN for every new input. In section 5.2.2
we investigate the time required to break the LCC using side-
channel or SAT attack and accordingly define a safe range for
U to prevent such attacks.
4.3 Reverse Engineering
In COMA, reverse engineering (RE) to extract the secret key
from layout is useless as the secret key is not hardwired in the
design and is generated based on PUF. RE to extract the key
from memory in an untrusted chip is no longer an option as
the key is not stored in the untrusted chip. RE to extract the
key from the trusted chip’s memory is limited by the difficulty
of tampering with secure memory in the trusted technology.
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Figure 6: The t-test results for unprotected (UnPr) and protected (Pr) implementations of AES-GCM and ACORN.
4.4 Algebraic Attacks
Algebraic attacks involve (a) expressing the cipher operations
as a system of equations, (b) substituting in known data for
some variables, and (c) solving for the key. AES-GCM and
ACORN have been demonstrated to be resistant against all
known types of algebraic attacks, including linear cryptanal-
ysis. Therefore, in the absence of any new attacks, the DCC
mode is resistant against algebraic attacks. Using CSN and
RCSN for fast encryption is new and requires more analysis.
CSN can be expressed as an affine function of the data input
x, of the form y = A · x+ b, where A is an n× n matrix and
b is an n× 1 vector, with all elements dependent on the in-
put TRN. Although recovering A and b is not equivalent to
finding the TRN, it may enable the successful decryption of
all blocks encrypted using a given TRN. We protect against
this threat in two ways: (1) The number of blocks encrypted
using a given TRN is set to the value smaller than n, which
prevents generating and solving a system of linear equations
with A and b treated as unknowns, (2) We partially modify the
TRN input of CSN with each block encryption (by a simply
shifting the input TRN bits), so the values of A and b are not
the same in any two encryptions, without the need of feeding
CSN with two completely different TRN values.
4.5 Counterfeiting and Overproduction
COMA can be used to prevent the resale of used ICs, usage of
illegal copies, and reproduction of a design. During packaging
and testing, each COMA protected IC is first tested and then is
matched with a trusted chip. So, the untrusted chip can only be
activated by the matched trusted chip or the registered remote
manager. Building illegal copies that work without the secure
chip (or remote activation) and reproduction of the design
requires successful RE. Blind reproduction is useless as its
activation requires a matching trusted chip or passing PUF
authentication of a remote manager. By receiving one or more
DALs for testing, the manufacturer cannot activate additional
IPs as the DAL changes from activation to activation.
4.6 Removal attacks
Removal of the TRNG fixates the DAL and breaks the LCC
mode. In DCC mode, it gives an attacker control over the
input to the AEAD, increasing the chances of SCA on the
cryptography engine. NIST standard SP 800-90B [12] dic-
tates that continuous health testing must be performed on
the TRNG. These tests include repetition counting to detect
catastrophic failure and adaptive proportion testing to detect
loss of entropy. Removal of the TRNG would be detected as
this would result in insufficient entropy to satisfy the health
test, assuming the test is implemented on the trusted chip.
Removal of COMA architectural modules makes the chip
non-functional as COMA is not a wrapper architecture, but a
fused one. Complete removal of COMA requires successful
RE. Removing the PUF can be made challenging by using a
strong PUF, with a large number of challenge-response pairs.
Replacing such a PUF with a deterministic function is chal-
lenging as such functions are likely to have a substantially
different area and power, making them detectable.
Table 1: Main features of the two proposed COMA variants.
Feature COMA1 COMA2
AEAD AES-GCM ACORN
PRNG AES-CTR Trivium
BUS Width 8 8
Pins used for Communication 8 8
CSN-RCSN Size 64 64
Trusted Memory 4 Kbits 4 Kbits
C f ix: initialization overhead (cycles) 10,492 20,452
Cbyte: cycles needed for encrypting each byte 72 17
PRNGper f : Throughput of generating PRN 128bit/10cycles 64bit/cycle
5 COMA Implementation Results
For evaluation, all designs have been implemented in VHDL
and synthesized for both FPGA and ASIC. For ASIC
implementation we used Synopsys generic 32nm educa-
tional libraries. For FPGA verification, we targeted a small
FPGA board, Digilent Nexys-4 DDR with Xilinx Artix-7
(XC7A100T-1CSG324).
5.1 COMA Area Overhead
We implemented two variants of COMA architecture: a NIST
compliant solution (denoted by COMA1) and a lightweight
solution (denoted by COMA2). The AEAD and PRNG in
COMA1 is based on AES-GCM and AES-CTR respectively.
The COMA2 is implemented by using ACORN for AEAD
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Table 2: Resource Utilization of the COMA Architecture for
NIST-compliant and lightweight solution.
Name AES-GCM+AES-CTR ACORN+Trivium
Slice LUT FF Slice LUT FF
TRUSTED
AEAD_EXT 1,336 3,804 4,432 333 1,067 591
RNG 712 2,226 618 215 601 450
CSN 257 540 739 257 540 739
Others 149 345 144 149 345 144
UNTRUSTED
AEAD_EXT 1,336 3,804 4,432 333 1,067 591
RNG 738 2,352 628 241 683 460
RCSN 252 607 737 252 607 737
ECC 563 1569 1161 563 1569 1161
PUF [48] 177 — — 177 — —
Others 209 359 257 209 359 257
On Xilinx Artix-7 (XC7A100T-1CSG324) FPGA.
Table 3: Resource Utilization for ASIC implementation of
NIST-compliant and lightweight COMA.
Name AES-GCM+AES-CTR ACORN+Trivium
Cells Areaum2 Tclkns PowermW Cells Areaum2 Tclkns PowermW
COMA 25338 0.11 1.97 1.62 8681 0.046 1.18 0.84
. RNG 5684 0.025 1.43 0.431 1267 0.007 0.27 0.144
. CSN/RCSN 1749 0.008 0.08 0.11 1749 0.008 0.08 0.11
. AEAD 13675 0.061 1.67 0.704 2257 0.013 0.97 0.251
. ECC 3278 0.016 1.34 0.321 3278 0.016 1.34 0.321
Using Synopsys generic 32nm libraries.
and Trivium for PRNG, The details of these two variants are
summarized in Table 1. The breakdown of area (in terms of
Slices, LUTs, and FFs) for these solutions for an FPGA imple-
mentation in Xilinx Artix-7 (using Minerva [14]) is reported
in Table 2. The breakdown of area (in terms of Cells and um2),
critical path, and power consumption for an ASIC implemen-
tation is reported in Table 3. Note that the 2.5D-COMA needs
both the trusted and untrusted parts of the architecture, while
the R-COMA only requires the untrusted part. Table 4 reports
optimized area and frequency results on FPGA for top-level
of trusted and untrusted sides. As illustrated, the total area
of lightweight solution is around 1/3 of the NIST-compliant
solution. The reported numbers in Table 2 include the over-
head of all sub-modules including AEAD, CSN-RCSN, RNG,
ECC, etc. Due to the optimization on the boundaries among
the units, resource utilization in Tables 4 is less than the sum
of row values in Table 2.
5.2 COMA Performance
Fig. 7 compares the performance of two solutions in DCC and
LCC mode. As illustrated, for small data sizes, the COMA1
outperforms the COMA2 solution. However, as the size of
data increases, the COMA2 outperforms the COMA1 solu-
tion. It is due to the fact that stream ciphers such as ACORN
have a long initialization phase, making them inefficient for
small data size. In addition, our AES-GCM implementation
Table 4: Optimized results of COMA Architecture for NIST-
compliant and lightweight solution.
Name AES-GCM+AES-CTR ACORN+Trivium
Slice LUT FF Freq[MHz] Slice LUT FF Freq[MHz]
Trusted 2,297 7,094 5,892 103 1,030 2,901 1,924 121
Untrusted 2,818 8,781 7,169 109 1451 4,182 3,156 120
On Xilinx Artix-7 (XC7A100T-1CSG324) FPGA.
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(AES-GCM + AES-CTR) and (ACORN + Trivium).
benefits from an 8-bit datapath, but the ACORN is realized
by a 1-bit serial implementation. The total latency in terms
of the number of clock cycles for COMA1 and COMA2 im-
plementations can be calculated using equation (1), in which
the number of cycles for the initialization and finalization
is fixed and is given in Table 1. The Cbyte is the number of
cycles needed for encrypting each input message byte, which
is 17 and 72 for COMA2 and COMA1, respectively. Hence,
in spite of longer initialization, the COMA2 outperforms the
COMA1 for message sizes larger than 128 Bytes.
Tcomm =C f ix +Messagesize×Cbyte (1)
5.2.1 COMA performance in LCC mode
In the LCC mode, the AEAD is used to synchronize the initial
seed of the PRNG, while the CSN is used for encrypting data.
The random (TRN) configuration key for the CSN-RCSN is
generated by PRNG, which is updated after transferring every
U messages. In COMA, the PRNG has a limited buffer size,
and as soon as the buffer is filled with random data, the PRNG
stops producing additional bits. The consumption of TRNG
output is synchronized (every U messages) and the generation
of random inputs is limited to the size of buffer. Hence, the
PRNGs in the trusted and untrusted sides are always in sync.
The number of cycles it takes to initialize the LCC mode
includes the time to initialize the secret key engine (C f ix), the
encryption and transfer and decryption of PRNG seed (CENC),
and the time for the PRNG to generate enough output from a
newly received TRN (CPRNG):
CLCC−init =C f ix +CENC +CPRNG (2)
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Depending on the AEAD used for transferring the original
seed, the C f ix is obtained from Table 1. The seed size in
our implementation is 16 Bytes, hence the CENC is simply
Cbytes×16, and the CPRNG is:
CPRNG =
Bitsneeded
PRNGper f
=
3n× (log2n−1)
PRNGper f
(3)
Finally, after initialization, and by using a CSN of size n
when the bus width of COMA is BW , the number of cycles to
encrypt and transfer one byte of information is:
CLLCbyte =
8
n
× ( n
BW
+1) (4)
Using a 64-bit CSN and BW of 8 bits, the CLLCbyte = 9/8.
Compared to CDCCbyte for the COMA1 (C
DCC
byte =72), and for the
COMA2 (CDCCbyte =17), the LCC mode is at least an order of
magnitude faster. Fig. 7 compares the superior performance of
LCC mode compare with DCC mode in both COMA variants.
5.2.2 Frequency of TRN updates in LCC mode
The frequency of TRN update (U) for LCC is an important
design feature. A large U reduces energy as PRNG/TRNG is
kept idle for U−P cycles. P is the number of required cycles
to refill the PRNG buffer after a TRN read. However, when the
TRN is fixated for a long duration of time, the possibility of a
successful side-channel, algebraic, or SAT attack on the CSN
increases. The minimum number of messages required for an
algebraic attack (even if such attack is possible) is n, which is
the CSN input size. Our experiments show that a SAT attack
could recover the key with an even smaller number of inputs.
Knowing the number of encryptions/decryptions needed by
such attacks, we can set the U to a safe value smaller than the
number of required messages to make it resistant against these
attacks. So, the value of U should be between P≤U ≤ n.
The SAT attack against CSN is implemented similar to
[41]. In this attack the CSN gate-level netlist and an activated
chip is available to the attacker, while the attacker aims to
extract the CSN-RCSN configuration signals. Table 5 captures
the results of the SAT attack against blocking and near non-
blocking CSNs. As illustrated, the time to break a near non-
blocking CSN is significantly larger. In each iteration SAT
test one carefully selected input message. Hence, if the U is
kept smaller than the number of required SAT iterations, the
SAT attack could not be completed.
5.3 Energy saving in LCC mode
As illustrated in Fig. 8(a), in the LCC mode, the TRN is
updated every U cycles. U is determined based on the fastest
attack on CSN-RCSN pair, which is the SAT attack. After
each TRN update, the PRNG takes P cycles to refill its buffer.
Note that P cycles required for PRNG could be stacked at the
beginning of U cycles, or distributed over U cycles depending
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Figure 8: The Power Consumption at LCC mode of operation.
on the size of PRNG buffer. As long as the TRN completely
changes every U cycle, the possibility of attack is eliminated.
Hence in each U cycles, for P cycles the PRNG/TRNG and
CSN are active, and for U −P cycles, the PRNG is clock
gated, and only CSN is active. In both cases, the AEAD is
active only for the initial exchange of PRNG seed, allowing
us to express the power consumption of the LCC mode as:
ELLC =CPRNG×PH +
(
U(
n
BW
+1)−CPRNG
)×PL (5)
Obviously, the number of required cycles to refill the PRNG
buffer after TRN read (P) affects energy consumption and
communication throughput. If P < U , as illustrated in Fig.
8(a), for U −P cycles the PRNG is kept idle (power-gated).
However, if P >U , as shown in Fig. 8(b), the communication
should be stopped for P−U cycles till the next TRN is ready
and to resist SAT or algebraic attacks.
The energy consumption of LCC mode for COMA archi-
tectures constructed using NIST-compliant and lightweight
solution when transmitting different size of messages is cap-
tured in Fig. 9. As illustrated, the LCC mode, for having to
synchronize the two sides using a TRNG seed, is burdened
with the initialization cost of AEAD. However, when the
CSN-RCSN and PRNG are setup, the energy consumed for
exchanging additional messages grow at a much lower rate
compare to DCC mode (which is dominated by AEAD and
PRNG power consumption as reported in table 3).
6 Comparing COMA with Prior Work
To the best of our knowledge, FORTIS [49] is the only com-
prehensive key-management scheme that was previously pro-
posed. Table 6 compares our proposed solution against FOR-
TIS. COMA addresses several shortcomings of the FORTIS:
1) In FORTIS, all chips use identical keys, hence there is
no mean of differentiating between chips. In COMA each
chip has a unique key generated by PUF. 2) In COMA, secret
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Table 5: SAT Execution Time on OMEGA-based Blocking CSN and LOGn,log2(n)−2,1 as a Close to Non-blocking CSN .
CSN Size 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512
Mode blk non-blk blk non-blk blk non-blk blk non-blk blk non-blk blk non-blk blk non-blk blk non-blk
SAT Iterations 6 14 7 18 8 25 12 31 14 TO 24 TO 25 TO TO TO
SAT Exe. Time (s) 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.2 2.35 0.8 79.18 5.9 TO 130.5 TO 1136.2 TO TO TO
TO: Timeout = 2×106 seconds; The SAT attack is carried on a Dell PowerEdge R620 equipped with Intel Xeon E5-2670 2.6 GHz and 64GB of RAM.
Table 6: COMA vs. FORTIS.
Scheme Key Management Data Comm Private Key SC Protected Session Key Activation Need to TPM RNG
FORTIS Constant 7* Embedded (known to the fab) 7 Vulnerable to Fault Attack Once at Untrusted PRNG
COMA PUF-based Unique X+ No private key at untrusted X Secure per Demand at Trusted TRNG
*: Not Implemented, but Naturally available using OTP. Limited Performance Due to Lightweight RSA
+: Available in Two Variant: DCC (Fully Secure and Limited Performance) and LCC (Leaky yet Secure and High Performance).
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
16 6432 128 256 512 1024
DCC (AES-GCM + AES)
LCC (AES-GCM)
Message Size (Byte)
E
n
er
g
y 
(n
J)
x 
10
4
0
5
10
15
20
25
E
n
er
g
y 
(n
J)
x 
10
3
Message Size (Byte)
DCC (ACORN + Trivium)
LCC (ACORN + Trivium)
16 6432 128 256 512 1024
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
DCC (AES-GCM + AES)
LCC (AES-GCM) while PRNG and CSN are active.
LCC (AES-GCM)while PRNG is clock-gated.
AES-CTR PRNGCSN
AES-GCMOthers
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
DCC (ACORN + Trivium)
LCC (ACORN) while PRNG and CSN are active.
LCC (ACORN) while PRNG is clock-gated.
AES-CTR PRNGCSN
AES-GCMOthers
Figure 9: Energy Breakdown in COMA.
key for communication and authentication is generated by
PUF, when FORTIS relies on embedding the private key and
public key in GDSII. So, the private key in FORTIS will
be known to the fabrication posing the risk that the entire
process of activation could be faked in software. In COMA,
such attack is prevented as secret key is generated by PUF
and is securely read out using public key cryptography. 3) In
FORTIS, the usage of the private key for chip authentication
is vulnerable to SCA. In COMA, the secret-key cryptography
is side channel protected, and the public-key encryption is
only used once, making COMA secure against SCA. 4) In
FORTIS, there is also the possibility of deploying a fault
attack by fixing the value of session key Ks. In COMA, the
same attack would require fixing the PUF output or replacing
the PUF with a known function. This however could be tested
by reading out the output of the PUF using multiple challenges
and performing statistical test on the PUF response (PUF
health check). 5) In FORTIS, the activation is done once,
hence there is a need to store the obfuscation key in the
untrusted chip. In COMA, the need to store the obfuscation
key in untrusted chip is removed. In R-COMA, the activation
takes place on demand, and the key is removed after power
down or reset. In 2.5D-COMA, the activation key is stored
in a trusted chip. 6) COMA provides two new mechanisms
for communication: a) the DCC mode for added security, and
b) the LCC mode for high-speed communication. 7) COMA
uses a TRNG to produce the seed for PRNG, while FORTIS
uses a PRNG without addressing a random source for its seed,
increasing its vulnerability.
Table 7: Area Overhead of COMA vs. FORTIS.
Design Gate Count FORTIS/Design COMA1/Design COMA2/Design
b19 40,789 24.52% 62.1% 21.28%
VGA_LCD 43,346 23.07% 58.45% 20.02%
Leon3MP 253,050 3.95% 10.01% 3.43%
SPARC 836,865 1.19% 3.02% 1.03%
Virtex-7 2M 0.5% 1.26% 0.43%
In terms of area overhead, FORTIS [49] provides an es-
timate for the incurred overhead of their solution, which is
around 10K gates. As shown in Table 3, the numbers of cells
for implementing the NIST-compliant (COMA1) implemen-
tation is 25.4K gates, while the lightweigh solution (COMA2)
is implemented using 8.7K gates. Table 7 compares the area
overhead of FORTIS against COMA1 and COMA2, when
these architectures are deployed to protect a few mid- and
large-size benchmarks. Using COMA2, which improves the
overhead by 14% compared to FORTIS, requires between
0.43% and 21.3% of circuit area in selected benchmarks.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we presented COMA, an architecture for
obfuscation-key management and metered activation of an
obfuscated IC that is manufactured in an untrusted foundry,
while securing its communication. The proposed solution re-
moves the need to store the key in the untrusted chip, makes
the obfuscation unlock-key a moving target, allows unique
identification of the protected IC, and secures the communi-
cation to/from the protected chip using two hybrid crypto-
graphic schemes for ultra-high-speed and ultra-security. Our
experimental results show that compared to the state-of-the-
art key management architecture, FORTIS, COMA is able to
reduce the area overhead by 14%, while addressing many of
the shortcomings of the previous work.
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